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Abstract
For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either
public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model
in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some non-
monetary benefit to the manager, which we call “bias” in the manner of production.
Since nonprofit firms must consume profits indirectly, they trade off differently than
for-profit firms. This difference is exaggerated in services where nonmonetary benefits
are particularly important but minimized when the firm is hit with a fixed-cost shock.
We test these predictions in a panel of California hospitals, finding evidence for each.
These results suggest that a model of public or nonprofit make-or-buy decisions should
be more than a simple relabeling of a model derived in the for-profit context.
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If you want a thing done well, do it yourself. - Napoleon Bonaparte
1 Introduction
With improved information technology, a growing list of services can be traded, expanding
outsourcing opportunities into new industries. While decisions about the for-profit firm’s
boundary are (relatively) well-understood, little is known about how nonprofit and public
firms make these decisions. This gap is particularly important in the health care industry,
where rising costs make outsourcing attractive, and where a diversity of nonprofit, public,
and for-profit providers provide services. In this paper, we analyze the make-or-buy decisions
of public, nonprofit, and for-profit California hospitals, demonstrate robust differences among
ownership types, and provide both a theoretically-grounded explanation for these differences
and tests of the proposed mechanism.
For-profit, nonprofit, and public hospitals in California vary significantly in the extent
to which they outsource service-provision. During 1998-2006, for-profit short-term general-
care hospitals outsourced 25.7 percent of the cost of an average service to outside providers,
with 5.5 percent of services completely outsourced. Nonprofits outsourced much less, 18.9
percent of the cost of an average service, with 2.9 percent of services completely outsourced.
The rates for public hospitals were similar to private nonprofits. Balakrishnan, Eldenburg,
Krishnan and Soderstrom (2010) show that these differences in average outsourcing rates are
robust to a number of controls for hospital and market characteristics. Given the importance
of the hospital industry and continued health expenditure growth, these outsourcing levels
are economically important.
Although profit-maximizing outsourcing is well studied (Lafontaine and Slade 2007), we
know less about the causes and consequences of the boundaries of other sorts of organizations.
To what extent and in what direction do the decisions of these non-firm organizations deviate
from the profit-maximizing choice? Some related work studies which services the public
sector chooses to contract out (Nelson 1997, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Hart,
Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Brown and Potoski 2003, David and Chiang 2009, Levin and
Tadelis 2010). These studies cannot address what is essentially “public” or “nonprofit” about
choices since they lack a control group of profit-maximizers. Instead, they are comparative
static in nature, analyzing how organizations adjust to changes in the economic or political
environment. This work can, instead, identify divergence in outsourcing decisions among
ownership classes in cross-section, compare these differences across services, and see how
these differences respond to exogenous cost shocks.
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To analyze the differences in outsourcing among ownership classes, we extend a well-
known model of nonprofit entrepreneurship by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) to include a
make-or-buy decision. In our model, the manager places some direct value on controlling the
exact manner in which the service is performed, either for his own intrinsic reasons or due
to influence from some interest group (such as elite workers) who have their own preferences
about how the service is performed. Our model predicts that outsourcing is more attractive
to for-profit firms than nonprofit firms whenever the outside producer has a comparative
advantage in providing relatively low cost services over which the manager will have little
control. This difference in outsourcing is amplified when the ability to control the manner
of production is particularly important and dampened when a fixed-cost shock lowers net
incomes.
We test these predictions on a rich dataset of California hospitals with service-specific
outsourcing measures and market characteristics over the period 1996-2008. For-profits
outsource consistently more than private non-profits, and public hospitals outsource even less
than private non-profits. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for hospital size
and scope, service-specific output, presence of a residency program, market characteristics,
as well as service, year, and county fixed effects.
To investigate the importance of control, we divide hospital services into classes about
which the managers may be particular concerned. For example, if elite workers are influential,
controlling the manner of production of physician-intensive medical services like cardiology
or emergency services may be more important, as compared to those that have little or no
physician labor, like grounds keeping or parking. We also highlight labor-intensive services,
where labor costs make up a big share of the total costs, since control of those services
may be particular salient for, especially, public managers. Outsourcing differences between
nonprofits and for-profits are much bigger for physician-intensive services. For non-physician-
intensive services, there is no significant difference in the extent of outsourcing between
for-profit and private nonprofit hospitals. However, public hospitals do not exhibit this
pattern; they consistently outsource less than for-profits across both classes of services. The
pattern for labor-intensive services is quite different. Labor intensity seems to have no
relationship with the outsourcing rates of private non-profits, but public hospitals outsource
labor-intensive services much less than similarly-situated for-profits (or private non-profits)
do.
The model’s second prediction is that a shock increases fixed costs should cause nonprofits
to look more like for-profits in their outsourcing decisions. We test this prediction by taking
advantage of California’s seismic retrofitting requirements. Nonprofit and public hospitals
that experience greater fixed costs outsource at rates similar to for-profits, while nonprofit
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and public hospitals that did not have a large fixed-cost shock act much differently. The
two predictions are also complementary, in that the convergence of nonprofit and for-profit
outsourcing rates is most evident in physician-intensive and labor-intensive services, where
the unconditional gap is biggest.
This paper contributes to two literatures. There is a burgeoning literature on the “bound-
ary of the organization” and how public entities provide services (Hart et al. 1997, Martimort
and Pouyet 2008, Levin and Tadelis 2010, Iossa and Martimort 2012), but nearly every em-
pirical investigation has focused on one ownership type. There is real novelty in being able
to compare and contrast. Hospitals are a particularly intriguing organization to investi-
gate, because the organizational forms span for-profit, private nonprofit, and various sorts of
publicly-operated institutions. A handful of papers have taken advantage of this diversity.
Coles and Hesterly (1998) touch on nonprofit and for-profit differences, but focus on how
transaction costs influence which hospital services are outsourced. Balakrishnan et al. (2010)
describe outsourcing differentials at the level of the hospital. We take their correlations as
motivation, show that the large differences by ownership type are robust within services, and
show that those differences are consistent with a model in which nonprofits are induced by
non-distribution constraints to trade-off costs versus control at a different rate than for-profit
firms do.
Second, there is a significant literature on the effects of nonprofit status on the behavior
of firms, in general, and hospitals, in particular.1 The particular issues in the context
of hospitals are nicely summarized by Sloan (2000). This literature has been particularly
concerned with the effect of ownership on the provision of service quality (Sloan et al. 2001,
Picone et al. 2002, Eggleston et al. 2008), but also on the role of competition (Duggan 2002),
managerial compensation (Ballou and Weisbrod 2003), and the deeper question of what
drives nonprofit behavior, more generally (Deneffe and Masson 2002, Horwitz and Nichols
2009, Chang and Jacobson 2011). The paper most related to ours, both in context and
approach, is Chang and Jacobson (2011), which looks at hospitals in California and also
uses seismic retrofitting as a exogenous cost shock. While they are concerned with the deep
question of “what nonprofits maximize,” we have a much more specific goal of looking at one
aspect of the production decision, outsourcing, to highlight an important difference in the
way nonprofit firms conduct their affairs. We focus on outsourcing as a component of total
production, but this is particularly relevant for answering the deeper question of how missions
and production decisions are made differently by ownership type. Outsourcing is important
because, although a nonprofit has chosen a particular mission, the firm is choosing to move
1For a nice synthetic summary of the general issue of nonprofit behavior, see Malani, Philipson and David
(2003).
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some production outside of the firm’s boundary – where the mission of the contracting firm
may be different. This change can have real effects if there are significant elements of the
service that are difficult to fully specify in the contract. We see our work as complementary
to the literature, as we identify an additional dimension along which “perquisite maximizing”
nonprofits differ from their “profit-maximizing” kin.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of nonprofit and
for-profit outsourcing behavior. Section 3 describes California hospital ownership types
and our data. Section 4 describes the econometric specification and discusses our results
on outsourcing, control, and fixed cost shocks. We have a brief discussion of alternative
explanations in Section 5 before concluding in Section 6.
2 A Model of Outsourcing
Consider a model of nonprofit behavior that borrows heavily from Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001), but adds an outsourcing decision. Assume the firm’s manager solves
max
pi,Z,b
u(pi, Z, b|ρ) = pi + v(Z) + ρb,
subject to
pi + Z ≤ I(b)− F,
where the manager maximizes over profits (pi), perquisites (Z), and production bias (b).
Returns to perquisites, v(Z), are increasing and concave with v′(0) = 1, meaning perquisites
have diminishing marginal returns. Perquisites are non-income benefits such as improved
working environment of the manager or employees, more generous benefits, better offices,
etc. Production bias, b, captures the degree of deviation from the net-income maximizing
manner of production for the given service. As a normalization, let b = 0 represent the net
income-maximizing level production bias, and assume that I(b) is concave and decreasing
in b. Moving away from the net income-maximizing manner of production is costly, but
may have value to the manager if his incentives are not solely determined by net revenues.
The value placed on additional control over the manner in which the service is provided is
parameterized by ρ. Finally, nonprofits have an additional constraint to set profits at zero,
so they must consume income as perquisites, Z.
Production bias (b) should be interpreted broadly to allow the maximization to reflect
a diversity of missions. It represents some feature of production (either input or output)
about which the manager has preferences over and above its impact on net revenues. The
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ρ term captures both the manager’s own intrinsic value and the value he is induced to
place on it as a result of influence by other interest groups, such as elite workers, governing
boards, or those in a position of political power over the manager.2 Elite workers, such as
physicians in the hospital context, are highly trained specialists with significant informational
advantages and decision influence. The manager might alter the service provision in services
with a large percentage of elite workers. Services with substantial elite worker production
might have greater potential for quality improvement, for example, and the workers, or the
manager himself, may benefit from gaining a reputation for working in or leading a high-
quality medical institution. However, that quality service could also produce better patient
outcomes (influencing revenues) but be costly to implement (influencing costs). The revenue
and cost effects of this high quality service appear in I(b), but the private benefits appear in
the ρb term. Alternatively, the manager could enjoy biasing production out of an altruistic
impulse, whereby the manager actually gets psychic benefit from providing excellent quality
care or high levels of uncompensated care, over-and-above the net revenue consequences. On
the other hand, perhaps the manager could be simply captured or influenced in some way
to place some extra weight on these elite workers. Elite workers may prefer some input or
output mix that differs from income-maximizing levels, and pressure the manager to alter
the provision of services they dominate. Doctors may pressure management to structure
production in favor of greater physician control. Other candidates could include political
pressures to over-employ labor. In that case, the manager might alter the mix of inputs
away from the net-revenue-maximizing mix.3
The key feature of this specification is that returns to perquisites fall off more quickly
than the returns to profits when net revenues decline. This is the idea that the marginal
dollar of constrained net income becomes less valuable more quickly than the marginal dollar
of unconstrained net income. That is, the marginal rate of substitution between production
2A more detailed version of this model could include interest group effort to exert influence over the
manager with some cost to the interest group. This would be similar to (Glaeser 2003). In the model above
we do not assume differential pressure or effort on the part of workers in nonprofit versus for-profit firms. If
we did include this elite worker effort, nonprofit elite workers would have a greater incentive to exert effort
because of the diminishing marginal returns to income in the nonprofit firm. The relative decisions between
nonprofit and for-profits would remain the same, but the differences would be stronger. We present only the
basic case above, and let the empirical section reveal the size of the relative differences.
3Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) assume managerial control is used to dictate the level of quality, only, and
that quality is non-contractible so the net income depends on both the expected level of quality and the
actual level of quality. Since their interest is in explaining why some firms choose to be nonprofit, they
focus on weakened incentives among nonprofit to reduce costs as a commitment device for maintaining high
quality. In equilibrium, this leads to higher revenues, which can make up for the requirement to consume
revenues through perquisites. We think about the value of control over the manner of production broadly
but abstract from the commitment problem. Nevertheless, the key results below would still hold in the
context of non-contractible quality.
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bias and perquisites diminishes more quickly than the marginal rate of substitution between
production bias and profit does. Thus for-profit firms will face a different trade-off than
nonprofits between additional income versus increased bias. This assumption implies that
nonprofits will be willing to pay more for production bias than a similar for-profit would
in cases where income is high. This is formalized by the concave returns to perquisites in
v(·). The other assumptions, such as the fact that the marginal value of the initial units
of perquisites is the same as the marginal value of a dollar of profits or that the marginal
utility of profits or bias is constant, are not integral. They make the analysis uncluttered.
In-House Production Figure 1 represents the optimal income/production bias choice
for nonprofit and for-profit firms, holding ρ fixed. Bias (b) appears on the x-axis and net
income I on the y-axis. Let j = fp denote for-profit and j = np denote nonprofit. The
maximizing bias choices for each type are bj, and incomes associated with this choice are
Ij ≡ I(bj)− F . The solid thick curve is the in-house production possibilities curve, labeled
I(b). The optimal choices of each firm type are formed by the tangency of the manager’s
indifference curve with the in-house production possibilities curve. The indifference curves
of the for-profit manager are given by the thin straight lines with slope −ρ, labeled “for-
profit IC.” For-profit indifference curves are straight because the tradeoff between income
and bias is constant for the for-profit firm. The gray indifference curves for the nonprofit
firm, labeled “nonprofit IC,” begin with the same slope as the for-profit on the x-axis, but
become steeper as income increases. Increasing income has diminishing marginal value for
a nonprofit because the nonprofit must consume income through perquisites due to the
nondistribution constraint. The optimal choices for each firm type are shown by the dots
on the in-house production possibilities curve. The familiar tangency condition assures that
bfp < bnp. Intuitively, since the marginal value of a constrained dollar is always less than
the marginal value of an unconstrained dollar, nonprofits choose higher levels of production
bias than for-profits do.
Outsourcing Assume now that the firm could choose to outsource production to some
third party, who offers a set of bias-income combinations. For a given level of bias, b,
let Ij(b) represent the threshold income for that b, above which the firm would choose
to outsource. That is, Ij(b) is the income that a firm of type j would choose the pair
(b, I) over in-house production for any income I ≥ Ij(b). The curve Ij(b) is the maximal
indifference curve attainable in-house. Figure 2 illustrates these cutoffs for one particular
level of production bias, bo, the dotted vertical line. The cutoff income Inp(bo) is the topmost
encircled intersection of the nonprofit indifference curve and the level of bias bo. The cutoff
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Figure 1: Optimal In-House Production by Firm Type
Income 
Production Bias 
income Ifp(bo), is the encircled intersection just above the thick in-house production curve.
For the particular level of bias, bo, the for-profit would find outsourcing at this level of bias
more attractive than the nonprofit would (in the sense that the for-profit firm would require
lower income to choose it over own-production), or Inp(bo) > Ifp(bo).
Because the marginal rate of substitution between bias and income for the for-profit firm
is smaller (in absolute size) than that of the similarly-situated nonprofit firm, these two
indifference curves cross exactly once and the crossing occurs between their optimal in-house
bundles. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2 where the intersection is contained in a dotted
circle, labeled on the corresponding axis as (b∗, I∗). The following proposition formalizes this
intuition. Proofs for all propositions are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 There is a unique combination (b∗, I∗) such that u(0, I∗, b∗) = u(0, Inp, bnp)
and u(I∗, 0, b∗) = u(Ifp, 0, bfp). This combination is bracketed by two in-house choices, in
the sense that bfp < b∗ < bnp and Ifp > I∗ > Inp. Furthermore,
1. If b ≥ b∗ then Inp(b) ≤ Ifp(b).
2. If b ≤ b∗ then Inp(b) ≥ Ifp(b).
Finally, let Io(b) represent the frontier of income-bias pairs available through outsourcing. A
firm of type j will outsource if and only if there is some control level such that Io(b) > Ij(b).
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Figure 2: Outsourcing Income Threshold by Firm Type
Income 
fixed threshold 
threshold 
Production Bias 
From this proposition, we can characterize when to expect nonprofit firms to outsource
more than for-profits and vice-versa. Intuitively, if outsourcing is the low-cost but low-bias
option, we should see for-profit firms outsourcing at a higher rate than nonprofit firms. If
outsourcing is the high-cost and high-bias option, we should see nonprofit firms outsourcing
at a higher rate. Obviously, if outsourcing is lower cost for all bias levels, everyone will
outsource, and if it is higher cost for all bias levels, no one will.
The following corollary formalizes these ideas.
Corollary 1 If Io(b) > I(b) only if b < b∗, then a nonprofit firm will outsource only if an
otherwise identical for-profit firm does. If Io(b) > I(b) only if b > b∗, then a for-profit firm
will outsource only if an otherwise identical nonprofit firm does.
Figure 3 represents a situation from Corollary 1 in which the outsourcing opportunity
is relatively cheap for low levels of bias, but producing in-house is relatively cheap for high
levels of bias. The thick multi-stripe frontier labeled Io(b) represents the new possibilities of
outsourcing opportunities. The thick line I(b) remains the in-house production possibilities.
The outsourcing frontier lies above the in-house production frontier only for low levels of bias.
Given this arrangement of production possibilities curves, there are outsourcing opportunities
above the for-profit firm’s maximal in-house indifference curve. However, all outsourcing
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Figure 3: Outsourcing Opportunity Set Where For-Profit Firm Outsources but Non-Profit
Firm Does Not
Production Bias 
Income 
threshold 
threshold 
opportunities are below the nonprofit firm’s maximal in-house indifference curve. Thus, the
for-profit firm chooses to outsource, while a nonprofit firm does not.
In interpreting the theoretical predictions, there are several reasons that outsourcing
might be the low-cost/low-bias option, where Io(b) > I(b) for low b. In addition to the
direct contractual obligations, Io(b) also includes all the costs of composing and managing
a (potentially quite complex) contractual relationship. Duties and contingencies have to be
clearly specified and appropriately anticipated. Unanticipated contingencies may result in
costly renegotiations. Performance must be monitored, and a breach on either side can lead
to costly and protracted legal proceedings (Bajari and Tadelis 2001, Levin and Tadelis 2010).
Of course, more finely tuned control over the manner of production would require even more
completely specified contracts and precise monitoring. Providing high quality service, for
example, is notoriously difficult to measure in a contractible way, and a contractor has strong
incentives to try to shade on quality to the extent that it lowers his costs. Similarly, a con-
tractor has strong incentives to try to game a contract that requires an inefficient production
mix (say favoring labor over capital), since returning to the optimal mix would reduce costs.
In both cases, the desire to game the contract increases as it specifies greater and greater
divergence from the profit-maximizing production method. At some point, the costs of guar-
anteeing very high levels of control over specific details of production contractually would
10
be prohibitive relative to in-house monitoring.
The cost of controlling production may also increase with outsourcing in this industry,
in particular, because of the structure of health care services. Hospitals are organized to
provide tertiary care, the most specialized consultative care for patients. Patients are referred
to hospitals from primary or secondary care, which are organized to provide more general
care. Thus, hospitals’ patients may already require the most specialized services in the local
market, so a full specification of appropriate performance is particularly difficult. In a sense,
the hospital gets the least standard cases, by design, and so a standardized contractual
solution may be particularly ineffectual. Of course, this pattern of comparative advantage
may not hold for every service, but it suffices, for our purposes, for it to hold on average.
The propositions and figures above show how outsourcing behavior differs for fixed pa-
rameters, however we can also investigate the comparative static predictions by firm type.
The model predicts that a shock to fixed costs (F increasing) will differentially affect the
two firm types. A fixed cost shock is a shift in net income for all levels of bias. For profit-
maximizing firms, changes in fixed costs have no effect on behavior (assuming profits remain
non-negative). By contrast, a nonprofit firm’s marginal benefit of increasing income depends
on the level of fixed costs. If F rises, the marginal benefit of perquisites rises, so the oppor-
tunity to outsource to a low-cost/low-bias producer becomes more attractive to a nonprofit
firm. This comparative static arises naturally from the non-distribution constraint, but it
would not obtain in a model where the only difference between non-profits and for-profits is
a difference in ρ, the importance of control over production bias. In that alternative model,
a fixed shock does not affect the marginal value of a dollar of additional net revenues and so
would not affect outsourcing decisions (other than through shut-down constraints).
A second comparative static is the response to a change in the importance of control over
production (ρ). If control over production is more important, a larger income advantage is
required to induce firms to outsource to a low-bias producer. Since nonprofits must consume
this income through perquisites, the effect is more pronounced for them. Of course, this
static also implies that if nonprofits have consistently higher ρs for (some subset of) services,
they will outsource (that subset of) services less, ceteris-paribus.
Finally, since the divergence of the nonprofit from the profit-maximizing choice is larger
for larger ρ, there is a cross-partial prediction, where the effects of a fixed-cost shock will be
larger for services where control over production is more important. The following proposi-
tion formalizes these three comparative statics.
Proposition 2 If b < b∗, then INP (b)− IFP (b) is positive , increases in ρ, decreases in F ,
and the marginal effect of increasing F is larger (in absolute value) as ρ increases.
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We cannot observe income cutoffs, but we interpret the proposition to mean that the
difference between nonprofit and for-profit firms’ outsourcing behavior should increase in the
importance of control over production and decrease in fixed cost shocks. We will examine
the evidence for and against these propositions below.
3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Institutional Background
Short-term general care hospitals in California are organized in one of four types: for-profit,
nonprofit, local, and district.4 For-profit hospitals have a private residual claimant on profits,
either shareholders or some limited partnership. Private nonprofits are 501(c)(3) registered
charitable organizations. To qualify for federal tax-exempt status, they must demonstrate
that they operate for a“charitable purpose,” and that no part of the organization’s net
earnings accrue to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. Public local hospitals
are operated as part of the budget of the local city or county (or both, jointly), usually
overseen by a board indirectly appointed by the elected local government. Public district
hospitals are controlled by a board of directly elected representatives by the residents on one
of California’s 85 health districts (although not every district operates a hospital). They are
funded by taxes at the district level, patient receipts, and intergovernmental transfers, and
they are part of a network of public health care providers within the district.5
3.2 Data Description and Summary
We examine the determinants of outsourcing behavior on an unbalanced panel of 433 short-
term care general services hospitals that operated in California during 1996-2008. These
hospital data come from the Annual Financial Data series from the California Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). For each hospital, we know a wide
variety of ownership, financial, and operating characteristics, including ownership class, num-
ber of licensed and staffed beds, patient mix, and location.
The main outcome variable of interest is service-specific outsourcing within a hospital.
4Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals are not included in this analysis.
5In fact, the situation is even more complicated by the fact that certain Districts license nonprofit
or for-profit providers to operate hospitals for them. We code these as for-profit or nonprofit, since
the licensees are residual claimants on profits and have managerial discretion in structuring operations.
For more detail about the governance structures employed by California public hospitals, see http:
//www.chcf.org/publications/2009/05/governance-models-among-california-public-hospitals
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Hospitals in our sample offer some subset of 85 unique services.6 Very common services in
our data are “diagnostic radiology,” “dietary”, “drugs sold to patients,” and “housekeep-
ing,” which are reported by nearly every hospital in nearly every year. Rarer services, like
“ electroencephalography” or “outpatient registration” are reported by a minority of the
hospitals. The median hospital has 56 services while the mean has 53.7.
We define a cost-based measure of service-specific outsourcing. Formally, for service s in
hospital h in year t we define
PctOuthst ≡ PurchasedServiceshst + ProfFeeshst
TotalDirectCosthst
× 100.
Our data include service-specific direct costs broken down into nine broad categories.7
Two of these cost categories make up the numerator of our outsourcing measure: “Purchased
Services” and “Professional Fees”. These costs include, for example, medical dialysis service
contracts, but would not include a leased machine operated by in-house personnel.8 The
denominator of our outsourcing measure is the total of direct costs only, not indirect ac-
counting costs, which mitigates any differences that ownership types may have in accounting
cost-allocation.
All physician costs, regardless of contracting type, are excluded from our outsourcing
service measures. The reason for this is because most California hospitals are not allowed
to directly employ physicians. Since the make-or-buy “decision” is actually not a choice for
many firms, but rather dictated by law, we exclude all physician fees from the outsourcing
measure. Our data from OSHPD reclassifies all physician and student expenses related to
care provision/supervision into an a stand-alone cost category, regardless of the physician’s
actual relationship to the hospital. Physician expenses related to care provision/supervision
include amounts formally charged either as a salary, to the hospital as a fee, or directly to
the patient as a professional fee. These are all allocated to services as “reallocated physician
expenses.” This restriction is applied across all for-profit, nonprofit, and public hospitals,
6These 85 unique services exclude three categories. 1. Several broad catch-all categories. (such as “Other
Daily Hospital Services”, the composition of which may vary across hospitals) 2. Services offered very rarely
(less than 300 hospital/year combinations, out of about 4500) 3. All medical research and education services.
The results are robust to including/excluding the rare services, and we explicitly report the results when we
limit the sample even further to only very common services.
7These categories are Salaries and Wages, Employee Benefits, Reclassified Physician and Student Ex-
penses, Professional Fees, Supplies, Purchased Services, Depreciation, Leases and Rentals, and Other Direct
Expenses.
8The full list of Purchased Services includes medical, repairs and maintenance, medical school contracts,
management services, collection agencies, and other purchased services. The Professional Fees category
includes non-physician medical fees, therapist fees, consulting and management fees, legal, audit, registry
nursing personnel, other contracted services, and other professional fees.
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including most residency programs. The main exception is teaching hospitals.910 As a result,
any differences in outsourcing by ownership must arise from factors other than differential
statutory restrictions on the ability to directly employ physicians.
Hospitals differ most in the extent of outsourcing of a given service, compared to the
decision to outsource at all. Because hospitals in our data are very similar on the decision to
outsource or not, we leave the interesting question of the extensive margin to another paper
and focus our analysis on the intensive margin. We define the intensive margin as the degree
of outsourcing, conditional on the decision to outsource a service at all, and we measure it
by log(PctOuthst).
Services vary considerably in the degree of outsourcing. “Renal Dialysis” is the most
outsourced service in our sample, with an average of 75.9 percent of costs going to outside
providers, while “Medical Supplies Sold to Patients” is the least outsourced at 0.60 percent
of costs. “Satellite Ambulatory Surgery” is the service that the most hospitals outsource
to any degree, while “Drugs Sold to Patients” is the service done completely in-house more
often than any other.
For hospital covariates we have measures of size, scope, mission, and market. For a time-
varying measure of size, we have the number of staffed beds. For scope, we have the number of
services offered. Both will enter the regressions in logs. For mission, we have an indicator for
whether the hospital has a residence program, since this may give particular incentives to do
work in house, for training purposes, and the fraction of patient days that are from Medicare
and Medical patients, since different patient mix may lead to different activities. We also
have an indicator for whether the state of California considers the hospital to be “rural”,
since the opportunities to outsource may be less in a less-developed market.11 For market,
we have market-level characteristics covering population, socioeconomic characteristics, and
demographics. Market characteristics were taken from the U.S. Census Records for the
years 1996-2006 and from the American Community Survey for 2006-2008. Census and ACS
variables were matched at the zipcode level into corresponding Hospital Service Areas (HSAs)
9Because teaching hospitals are more likely to be nonprofit, this exemption may fall disproportionately
on nonprofit hospitals. Section 5 discusses why this is not a concern in our analysis approach.
10A few smaller exceptions to directly employing physicians include county hospitals and HMOs licensed
under the Knox-Keene Act (such as Kaiser).See Physician-Hospital Integration 2012: How Health Care
Reform is reshaping California’s Delivery System. For The California HealthCare Foundation by the Camden
Group. April 2012.
11A subset of about 20 of California’s hospitals qualify for the Medicare “Critical Access Hospi-
tal” program for rural hospitals. These hospitals may face different incentives to provide services,
and to provide them in-house. We have included them in the sample, but we repeated the en-
tire analysis removing these hospitals, with no substantive effects on the results. For details on
this program, see http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
MLNProducts/downloads/CritAccessHospfctsht.pdf.
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of each hospital. HSAs capture local health care markets for hospital care as a collection of
zipcodes whose residents receive most of their hospitalizations from the hospitals in that area.
To control for the size of market, we include total population estimates. Socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics include median household income, education attainment, and
race percentages within the total population. The average unemployment rate for the year
in the hospital’s county from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. County fixed-effects control
for the general market in which the hospitals find themselves, as well as year and service
fixed-effects to keep the comparisons within a service and remove common economic shocks.
Finally, to control for service-specific returns to scale, we have service-specific measures
of output. The specific measure reported by the OSHPD varies considerably by service.
For example, the measure of output for all daily hospital services is “patient days”, and for
most ambulatory services it is “visits”, but for ancillary services it is very service-specific:
deliveries, operating minutes, tests, or sessions. For the non-revenue-generating services,
it also varies a lot. The measure for the printing and duplicating service is “reams of
paper,” while that for the social work services is “number of personal contacts.”12 Since
these measures are not commensurable, we will also allow the coefficient on output in any
regression that includes them to vary by service, with the levels given in logs.
Table 1 summarizes these variables by hospital ownership class. We present results for
all 85 services, but in the Appendix we replicate our results by limiting the analysis to the
36 most common services, which are offered by at least 3000 hospital/year combinations.
They are consistent with the full-sample results. In the summary statistics, all hospital-level
variables are weighted by the number of services, since they will naturally weighted in that
way in the regressions.
Differences in outsourcing behavior between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are evident
in the summary statistics. For-profit hospitals outsource on average about 25.7 percent of
costs, compared to 19 percent for private nonprofit hospitals. District and local hospitals
also outsource less on average than for-profit hospitals. The fraction of services which are
completely outsourced varies in a similar way. The ownership types are much more similar
when looking along the extensive margin, however, averaging about 87 percent of services
outsourced to some degree.
Private for-profits are mostly small urban hospitals. They are much smaller than non-
profit or local hospitals, averaging 144 beds per facility and 54 services. For-profits are
least likely to offer residency programs and are highly urban, with only 5 percent of hospi-
tals located in rural areas. Accordingly, for-profit hospital markets have the highest HSA
12A complete list of services and output measures available at http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/
Hospitals/AnnFinanData/Manuals/index.html.
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populations, the highest median household income, and the second highest percent black.
Nonprofit hospitals tend to be large medical complexes in relatively well-off areas. Non-
profit hospitals average 222 beds and 58 services, second only to local hospitals. They also
have the smallest percentage of MediCal patients, at 20 percent, and the highest percentage
of Medicare patients, at 45 percent. Only 70 percent of the services offered by nonprofit
hospitals are “common” services, defined as a service offered by at least 3,000 hospital/years
in the sample. This is the lowest percentage among the ownership types, indicating that
nonprofit hospitals are offering the broadest scope services. Residencies are offered by about
half of nonprofit hospitals, second only to local hospitals. Nonprofits’ HSAs have the low-
est average percent poor and the second-highest median household income, quite close to
for-profits.
District hospitals are small, traditionally rural hospitals. They have the smallest number
of staffed beds, 126, and offer the lowest number of services, 53. District hospitals are the
second largest provider for MediCal patients, behind local hospitals. Over 75 percent of
district hospital services are “common services,” second only to for-profits. Districts are
least likely to offer residencies, and are by far the most rural. Over 57 percent of district
hospitals are classified as rural, almost 5 times the other types’ rates. Accordingly, district
hospitals have the lowest average population in the HSA, the lowest median income, and the
lowest percent black.
Local hospitals are commonly very large teaching hospitals. These hospitals have the
largest average number of beds, at 264, and offer about 57 services. These hospitals serve
the greatest percentage of MediCal patients, at over 52 percent, and the least number of
Medicare patients. The mix of services offered is slightly less diverse than nonprofits but
broader than the other two classes. Local hospitals are by far the most likely to offer
a residency program, with 82 percent of the local hospital observations doing so. Local
hospitals are in populous HSAs, second only to for-profit hospitals, but have a lower median
household income.
The differences in outsourcing behavior among ownership types motivates a further in-
vestigation, but the important differences in observables means that a careful econometric
approach will be required to assure that the differences in outsourcing is not being driven
entirely by differences in circumstance. The following section provides that analysis.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Ownership Type, Weighted by Number of Services.
For-Profit Private NP District Local
Percent Outsourced 25.72 19.00 20.61 18.03
(33.94) (28.65) (30.44) (27.75)
Service Completely Out 0.0558 0.0293 0.0449 0.0228
(0.229) (0.169) (0.207) (0.149)
Service Any Out 0.864 0.865 0.868 0.873
(0.343) (0.341) (0.338) (0.333)
Staffed Beds 143.5 221.7 126.3 264.0
(92.75) (148.9) (106.8) (208.3)
Services Offered 53.69 58.05 52.60 56.68
(8.725) (9.887) (10.42) (7.739)
Pct. MediCal 26.48 20.13 38.49 52.90
(21.58) (15.85) (25.64) (13.76)
Pct. Medicare 42.76 45.20 37.01 16.17
(18.59) (14.00) (19.44) (10.89)
Common Service 0.771 0.706 0.758 0.724
(0.420) (0.456) (0.428) (0.447)
Residency Program 0.387 0.469 0.347 0.820
(0.487) (0.499) (0.476) (0.384)
Rural 0.0521 0.125 0.578 0.119
(0.222) (0.331) (0.494) (0.324)
Pop. in HSA 503049.3 337824.1 131155.2 421916.3
(641006.4) (425820.2) (170481.8) (487000.6)
Pct. Black in HSA 6.890 5.211 3.230 7.838
(7.987) (6.307) (4.237) (9.718)
Pct. Poor in HSA 14.48 13.16 14.68 14.99
(6.916) (6.056) (6.232) (6.328)
med. HH Earn in HSA 45855.9 45759.4 38008.1 42390.2
(15260.6) (14594.3) (11241.9) (12924.7)
HS Grad in HSA 21.24 21.76 25.07 22.02
(5.028) (5.842) (5.684) (5.341)
Some Col. in HSA 25.75 26.65 27.44 25.78
(8.403) (8.984) (9.402) (9.240)
Pct Bach. in HSA 15.93 16.69 12.29 14.22
(6.636) (7.457) (5.630) (7.273)
Pct Grad/Prof in HSA 7.958 8.562 5.796 7.192
(4.793) (6.036) (3.385) (4.296)
County Unemp. 5.846 6.316 7.891 7.486
(1.871) (2.377) (3.871) (4.049)
n 62k 134k 28k 15k
Sample means and standard deviations in parentheses at the service x hospital x year level.
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4 Econometric Specification and Results
4.1 Econometric Specification
Conditional on the decision to outsource the service to any degree, we model the underlying
preference for outsourcing intensity as
(1) log(PctOuthst) =
∑
j
βjOwn
j
ht + γ1s + γ2sOutputhst + ΓXht + hst,
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the percent of costs due to outside con-
tracts, Ownjht is a dummy taking a value of 1 if hospital h is of ownership type j in year
t, the γ’s are service-specific intercepts and output slopes, and Xht is the set of controls
described in section 3.2, as well as county-specific and year-specific intercepts. The sample
statistics suggest that the primary difference among ownership types comes from differences
in this margin, the intensity of outsourcing.
In fact, we observe the choice of intensive margin only in the cases where the hospital
decides to outsource at all, a selected sample of the population. Naively dropping those
observations and ignoring the sample selection can lead to biased estimates, so we need to
model the extensive margin, as well–whether to outsource at all–even if our primary interest
is in outsourcing intensity. Let ysht represent the payoff to firm h in year t from outsourcing
service s at the profit-maximizing intensity level, relative to the zero-normalized payoff of
producing that service entirely in house. The true payoff is unobservable, but our empirical
model for this outsourcing payoff is
(2) yhst =
∑
j
βjOwn
j
ht + γ1s + γ2sOutputhst + ΓXht + hst,
where the independent variables are identical to those in (2). Under joint normality, the
bias of our intensity estimate can be corrected by jointly estimating equations (2) and (1)
using a maximum likelihood estimator (Heckman 1979). In fact, as we will see below, the
evidence is that this bias is not significant, and the naive estimates are extremely close to
the corrected estimates.
Finally, there is a question of which covariates are appropriate to include as control
variables. On the one hand, we know that for-profit hospitals and the various types of
non-profits are dissimilarly situated, on average, in terms of economic environment, patient
mix, and even scale and scope of operations. These difference are quite apparent in the
sample means, and these factors may be correlated with the attractiveness of outsourcing
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for reasons unrelated to the ownership form of the hospital. Thus, we may want to control
for these factors in order to contrast the various nonprofit forms to a hypothetical similarly-
situated for-profit hospital. Failing to do so may result in biased estimates, since outsourcing
differentials may result from these third factors that are correlated with ownership.
On the other hand, the dissimilar situations did not arrive by happenstance. Instead, they
often result from hospitals of different ownership types making different business decisions.
To take one example, consider the hospital’s decision to operate in an urban market. We
know that, on average, for-profit hospitals are more likely to operate in urban markets than,
especially, their district hospital counterparts. If part of the reason they do this is because
for-profit hospitals want to avail themselves of the thicker markets for outsourcing services
in urban areas, then the decision to locate in an urban area is an intermediate outcome
to the decision to outsource at higher rates. If this is the case, then urban location is an
inappropriate control and including it will introduce bias. Put another way, if for-profits
hospitals have some unmodelled reason to prefer locating in urban locations, then those
for-profit hospitals that choose to operate in rural areas have some unusual (unobserved)
characteristic. Thus, they are not actually similarly situated to rural district hospitals,
which do not need some unusual characteristic to choose a rural setting. This induced
difference becomes a problem whenever that unobserved characteristic also influences the
attractiveness of outsourcing.
We believe that the omitted variable problem induced by having too few controls is more
severe than the intermediate-outcome problem, and we will, therefore, present regression
estimates including the full set of controls outlined. We also perform our estimates for
a smaller set of controls that are plausibly beyond the control of the firm, omitting the
controls for patient mix, residency, number of beds, number of services, and service-specific
output. These estimates are less likely to suffer from the intermediate-outcome problem and
consistently result in larger differences (results in Tables 13-16, not for publication). The
sample means, of course, reflect the uncontrolled differences.
4.2 Differences in Overall Outsourcing Levels
Table 2 shows the results of the full estimation of the Heckman selection model and from a
Fixed-Effects OLS estimate of the intensity of services outsourcing. The coefficients report
marginal effects, calculated at the mean of the covariates. The first thing to note is the
similarity of the OLS and Heckman results. They are essentially indistiguishible, suggest-
ing that the naive approach where we limit our attention to services that are outsourced
at all is not leading to major biases. This result is not too surprising, given that about
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87-percent of service-hospital-year observations are outsourced to some extent and we are
already controlling for many of the factors that might guide that decision. Given the high
level of similarity, for the rest of the analysis we will ignore selection and simply present OLS
results, for brevity.
The more substantive results are generally in accord with the first basic prediction of
the model about outsourcing differences. Nonprofit hospitals outsource over 8 percent less
than similarly-situated for-profits.13 District hospitals are similar to private nonprofits, out-
sourcing about 11 percent less intensely than their for-profit counterparts . Local hospitals
are the least intense outsourcers of all, outsourcing about 33 percent less intensely than
similarly-situated for-profit hospitals.
The hospital-level control variables relate to outsourcing in the ways we might expect.
Larger hospitals, either in terms of number of services or in terms of number of staffed beds,
outsource less intensely on average. Neither patient mix nor having a residency program is
associated with outsourcing intensity. Demographic variables are only rarely significant in the
either of these regressions, likely because most important differences are already controlled
for with county fixed effects. Since this will be generally true throughout, we will not always
report these coefficients.
4.3 Outsourcing and the Importance of Specific Services
Our model of outsourcing behavior implies bigger differences among ownership types when
control over the services is particularly important to the manager. This implication is made
explicit in Proposition 2, where the difference between nonprofit and for-profit outsourcing
behavior should increase in the importance of production bias. In this section, we will test
that implication by looking at how outsourcing decisions vary by service. In particular, the
literature has identified two sorts of services that might be particularly important to the
manager: services that are important to elite workers, since those workers might influence
the manager, and services that are particularly labor-intensive, since those services could
potentially be salient political overseers and regulators (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 2000,
Clark and Milcent 2011). We will investigate each.
The literature on the behavior of nonprofit hospitals focuses on physicians, in particular,
as likely candidates employees with strong influence on the manager. As Glaeser (2003) puts
13It is possible that some subset of the nonprofits in our sample are simply “for-profits in disguise”, by
somehow evading the non-distribution constraint. Here, and throughout, the existence of such firms would
attenuate our estimated differences, as compared to the actual difference between truly constrained nonprofits
and their unconstrained for-profit counterparts.
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Table 2: Outsourcing and Ownership Type
(1) (2)
OLS Heckman
Non-Profit −0.086∗ −0.086∗
(0.046) (0.045)
District −0.115∗ −0.116∗
(0.068) (0.068)
Local −0.399∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089)
Log Staffed Beds −0.105∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036)
Log (Services) −0.180 −0.168
(0.151) (0.150)
Rural 0.008 0.009
(0.067) (0.067)
Pct. MediCal 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pct. Medicare 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pop. in HSA −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Pct. Black in HSA 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
County Unemp. −0.006 −0.006
(0.009) (0.009)
Pct. Poor in HSA −0.006 −0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
HS Grad in HSA −0.002 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Some Col. in HSA −0.005 −0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
med. HH Earn in HSA 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Residency Program 0.025 0.024
(0.036) (0.036)
county FE yes yes
service FE yes yes
service-specific output yes yes
Observations 200k 232k
OLS and Heckman models with dependent variable of natural log of the percent of costs that are expended on
outside contracts. All regressions include county fixed-effects, service fixed-effects. Standard errors, clustered
by hospital, in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10. Dependent variable excludes all physician
services costs, regardless of contracting type.
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Table 3: Outsourcing Differential by Physician- and Labor-Intensity
(1) (2)
Physician Labor
Non-Profit −0.063 −0.079∗
(0.045) (0.044)
District −0.097 −0.088
(0.071) (0.069)
Local −0.374∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.084)
Non-Profit x Physician Intensive −0.181∗∗∗
(0.059)
District x Physician Intensive −0.146
(0.098)
Local x Physician Intensive −0.182
(0.132)
Non-Profit x Labor Intensive −0.074
(0.065)
District x Labor Intensive −0.247∗∗
(0.098)
Local x Labor Intensive −0.390∗∗
(0.180)
Hospital Controls yes yes
HSA Controls yes yes
county FE yes yes
service FE yes yes
service-specific output yes yes
Observations 200k 200k
Dependent variable is the natural log of the percent of costs that are outside contracts. (d) indicates a
dummy variable. Standard errors, clustered by hospital, in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗
p < 0.10. Dependent variable excludes all physician services costs, regardless of contracting type.
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it, “the modern hospital is an outcome of the increasing power of doctors, who shaped the
hospital toward their own interests.” At the extreme, Pauly and Redisch (1973) model the
hospital directly as a physician’s cooperative. We need not go that far, however, and merely
require that physicians can have some substantial influence on the induced preferences of
the manager, especially in domains about which they have big informational advantages
and strong incentives to influence. To identify these sorts of service, we rank each service
by its degree of physician intensity, the average fraction of total direct costs attributable to
physician and student expenses.14 We designate the services in the top quintile as “physician-
intensive services”.15
But even non-elite workers may have influence, at least indirectly (through elected offi-
cials, regulators or unions). Especially in the case of local hospitals, which are buried within
the city or county government, it could be a desire by those political principals to disguise
redistribution as public employment (Alesina et al. 2000), a mechanism for “Keynesian” em-
ployment policy, simple political patronage, or even capture by organized labor. Thus, we
may expect services for which labor makes up a substantial share of the costs to be particular
important to the manager to control. We identify labor-intensive services using a measure
similar to what we constructed to measure physician-intensive services. For each service in
each hospital in each year, we calculate the percent of direct costs represented by wages and
benefits. Since some outsourcing also includes labor costs, this measure represents a mini-
mum of the labor share of costs, but it is an underestimate for services that are significantly
outsourced. For this reason, we construct two other measures of labor intensity: the share of
non-outsourced direct costs represented by wages and benefits and the share of total direct
expenses represented by wages, benefits, and contracts without outside providers. The latter
of these measures is an upper bound on the true labor intensity, while the second metric will
lie between the other two. For each of the three metrics, we find the average labor intensity
for every service over all hospital/year observations, and rank the services using each mea-
sure. Finally, we define a service as labor intensive if it is among the top third of services
14We used an alternative proxy in a prior version of this paper, where we followed the OSHPD division of
services into revenue-generating and non-revenue-generating subsets. Revenue-generating services are those
for which the hospital bills insurance and patients, thus these services are generally medical services, where
physicians may have a greater impact on management policy. Non-revenue generating services are services
which the hospital must provide for its operations, like groundskeeping, parking, and accounting, but for
which the hospital does not generally charge. The results are quite similar for this proxy of physician-
intensity. These results also, broadly, square with some results broadly contrasting clinical and non-clinical
costs at the hospital level (Balakrishnan et al. 2010).
15Physician-intensive services include pediatric intensive care, neonatal intensive care, adult psychiatric
acute care, physical rehabilitation care, emergency services, clinic services, satellite clinic services, psychi-
atric partial hospitalization, anesthesiology, pathological lab services, cardiology services, electromyography,
electroencephalography, pulmonary function services, psychiatric therapy, and medical staff administration.
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in each of the metrics. If all the labor-intensity metrics were identical, this procedure would
identify 28 services, but since the ranking differs to some degree among the rankings, only
14 services meet all three criteria.16 We feel confident that all the services we so identify are,
in fact, labor intensive, but we have probably missed a number of labor-intensive services,
particularly those that are outsourced to a high degree, because they would probably fail to
satisfy the first criterion.17
Table 3 presents the results for variants of regression equation (1), where ownership type
is interacted with an indicator for whether the service is physician intensive (in column (1))
or labor intensive in column (2)). The coefficients on the non-interacted ownership dummies
represent the relationship between ownership and outsourcing for non-intensive services,
while the sum of the coefficients on the interacted and non-interacted dummies represent the
relationship for intensive services. If physician-intensity is a good proxy for the importance
of control of the service to elite workers (pace labor intensity), and our model is correct,
we should see bigger differences in outsourcing for the physician-intensive services. We will
discuss each service and ownership type in turn.
Consider, first, the results for physician intensity. For non-intensive services, there are
no statistically-significant differences between the outsourcing intensity of for-profit hospi-
tals and either private non-profits or district hospitals. The local hospitals, by contrast,
do outsource even the non-physician-intensive services at much lower rates than all other
ownership types. For physician-intensive services, by contrast, all three types of nonprofits
outsource much less intensely than their for-profit counterparts, and the differences range
from about 20 percent for the private nonprofits and district hospitals, up to over 40 percent
for the local public hospitals. The differences are statistically significant and large. As our
model predicts, the difference between the nonprofit firms’ outsourcing intensity and their
for-profit counterparts’ outsourcing intensity is much larger for physician-intensive services
than it is for non-physician-intensive services. The gap in outsourcing intensity is between
15 and 20 percent bigger for physician-intensive services, although the result is statistically
significant in the case of private nonprofits, only.
Consider, now, the results for labor intensity. The pattern of outsourcing differences
for non-labor-intensive services is similar to that for non-physician-intensive services, with
small differentials for the private and district non-profits and large differentials for the local
hospitals. The differential pattern for labor-intensive services, however, is quite different
16They are: Intensive Care, Coronary Care, Definitive Observation, Acute Care, Psychiatric Acute-Adult,
Alternate Birthing Center, Physical Rehabilitation, Sub-Acute Care, Skilled Nursing Care, Observation Care,
Social Work Services, Outpatient Registration, Nursing Float Personnel, and Utilization Management.
17Expanding the definition to include all services that meet two of the three criteria does not substantially
alter our results.
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from what we observed for physician-intensive services. For private non-profits, there are
small and statistically-insignificant differences between the outsourcing differential of labor-
intensive and non-labor-intensive services. Both classes of public hospitals, by contrast,
outsource labor-intensive services at a much lower intensity, as compared to their for-profit
counterparts, than they do non-labor-intensive services. The magnitudes are quite large,
between 20 (district) and 40 (local) percent, and strongly statistically significant.
To sum up, the pattern of outsourcing intensity suggests that, in addition to having
different mean levels of outsourcing intensity, the managers of public and private non-profits
also seem to be particularly interested in maintaining control of different subsets of services.
If we think of outsourcing as a cost-control tradeoff, private non-profits are maintaining
control of services that are physician-intensive, and act quite similar to for-profits for non-
physician-intensive services. Public hospitals also maintain increased control of, but they also
outsource non-physician-intensive services less intensely than for-profits do. The pattern for
labor-intensive services is quite different, with only the public firm appearing to be especially
interested in maintaining control of labor-intensive services. To take a simple example, all
non-profit firm types maintain (relatively) tighter control of neo-natal intensive care than
they do of groundskeeping, but public hospital also keep a tighter hold on social-work services
and skilled nursing care, while private non-profits do not.
Taken together, these results illustrate three points. First, nonprofit and for-profit re-
sponses to physician-intensity and labor-intensity are distinct. Note how this contrast differs
from a comparative static exercise of comparing outsourcing rates across services within
an ownership class, as Coles and Hesterly (1998), Lopez de Silanes et al. (1997), or Levin
and Tadelis (2010) do. We can say not only that non-profits respond to physician- and
labor-intensity, but also that they respond for reasons distinct from profit motivation.
Second, nonprofit and public responses to non-physician-intensity are also distinct. What-
ever is driving the difference between public and for-profit outsourcing rates, it does not seem
to be the same thing that is driving the difference between public and for-profit rates, or at
least it is not the only thing. In our model, the services for which control is important may
be different for public hospitals than for private nonprofits, and how public hospitals bias
production is not entirely captured by physician intensity. In fact, public hospitals outsource
considerably less than private nonprofits for both service types, so another factor must be
at work.
Finally, nonprofit and public responses to labor-intensity are distinct. Public hospitals are
distinctly interested in controlling labor-intensive services, while private non-profit exhibit
no such pattern. Thus, this is not simply a results of a nonprofits lack of residual claimancy,
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a feature both types share. There is some evidence that public hospitals are particularly
sensitive to labor. Clark and Milcent (2011) find, for example, that public hospitals in France
react to rises in local unemployment rates by increasing employment, while private nonprofit
hospitals show no similar pattern. We document another effect of public hospitals apparent
interest in control of labor–it can lead them to draw the boundaries of the firm in a way that
differs from both for-profit firms and private non-profits.
4.4 Outsourcing After a Fixed-Cost Shock
According to Proposition 2, if outsourcing is a tradeoff between cost and control of pro-
duction, the decisions of the different firm types should become more similar as the budget
tightens. This prediction arises directly from the concavity of the nonprofit’s utility from
perquisites. If there is a large fixed cost shock, the amount available to spend on perquisites
is relatively low, and the marginal value to the nonprofit firm of an extra dollar to spend on
perquisites is high.
We use a change in regulatory requirements enacted in California in 1994 to capture a
fixed-cost shock. This regulation (SB 1953) required short-term general care hospitals in
earthquake zones to meet relatively strict engineering standards. The regulation went into
effect in 1998, and the first deadline for meeting the loosest standard (no SPC-1, extremely
vulnerable, buildings) was January 2008. A stricter standard (no SPC-2, vulnerable, build-
ings) was mandated for January 2030. For many hospitals, meeting this requirement involved
very extensive retrofitting of existing buildings, and most have preferred to construct new
buildings, at costs of tens to hundreds of millions of dollars (Meade and Hillestand 2007).
The hospitals should, thus, have been aware of existence of the shock throughout our sample
period, although they may have learned over time about their exact cost.
The actual costs incurred to retrofit or construct new buildings that meet the mandate
will be endogenously determined by the firm, but we proxy for the underlying exogenous
cost shock by the peak ground acceleration in the location– a measure of earthquake risk
(Meade, Kulick and Hillestand 2002). Peak ground acceleration is the maximum fraction
of the acceleration of gravity that will occur with a 10-percent probability over the next 50
years. See Chang and Jacobson (2011) for an extensive discussion of the implementation
of the mandate, and an overview of the relationship between peak ground acceleration and
costs.18 The peak ground acceleration of hospitals in our dataset ranges from 0.05 to 1.15.
The distribution is centered around the mode of 0.45 and falls off evenly to either side, with a
standard deviation of 0.21. The four ownership types have similar peak ground acceleration
18Chang and Jacobson provided us with this acceleration measure, for which we are very grateful.
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average values, about 0.50.
Table 4 presents the results a variant of regression equation (1) in which we interact own-
ership type with the peak ground acceleration experienced by the hospital. The prediction is
that the difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals should be most marked when
acceleration is small (and the cost shock is least severe). Column (1) presents the results on
the full sample of services, while the remaining columns break the services into sub-samples
with respect to physician- and labor- intensity.
The cost shock regressions in Table 4 support our model’s predictions. The non-interacted
ownership indicators are the predicted difference in outsourcing intensity between the in-
dicated ownership type and a for-profit for a hypothetical hospital that experienced no
earthquake risk. In the full sample, low-shock nonprofits outsource between 20 percent
less intensely (private nonprofit) and 40 percent less intensely (local public) than low-shock
for-profit hospitals. The large positive coefficients on the ownership types interacted with
the shock show that the expected outsourcing differential shrinks as the cost shock grows,
although none of the interactions are statistically signifi cant in the full sample. The rela-
tionship between cost shocks and outsourcing differentials is best seen in figures. Figure 4
shows the predicted outsourcing difference between hospitals of the indicated ownership type
and a similarly situated for-profit hospital as a function of the size of the fixed cost shock.
The solid line shows the expected difference, and the dotted lines are 95-percent confidence
intervals. A negative number along the vertical axis means that hospitals of the indicated
type outsource less intensely than similarly-situated for-profits do. As peak ground acceler-
ation grows, the predicted difference approaches zero for all three ownership types. At the
mean peak ground acceleration (0.5), we can strongly reject the null of no difference for the
local hospitals, and marginally so for private nonprofits and district hospitals. By the time
we reach the maximum peek ground acceleration in our sample (1.15), only local hospitals
show predicted outsourcing less than for-profit hospitals.
Turning to the service-type subsamples, the model predicts a stronger relationship be-
tween cost shocks and outsourcing for the services where control is more important. For
both labor-intensity and physician intensity, the non-interacted results are completely con-
sistent with the findings in the previous section: low-shock private non-profits and local
hospitals differentially keep control of physician-intensive services and low-shock local public
hospitals differentially keep control of labor-intensive services. As the shock grows, private
nonprofits and local hospitals come to outsourcing physician-intensive services and local hos-
pitals outsource labor-intensive services more and more like for-profits do. These effects are
much bigger than they are for non-physician-intensive or non-labor-intensive services. Again,
private non-profits do not seem differentially responsive to cost shocks for labor intensive
27
Table 4: Outsourcing and Seismic Cost Shocks
Physician Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Intensive Not Intensive Not
Non-Profit −0.224∗∗ −0.547∗∗∗ −0.177 −0.191 −0.224∗∗
(0.111) (0.207) (0.116) (0.231) (0.113)
District −0.233 −0.111 −0.254 −0.356 −0.218
(0.145) (0.232) (0.157) (0.243) (0.154)
Local −0.563∗∗ −0.963∗∗ −0.489∗ −1.499∗∗∗ −0.433∗
(0.262) (0.412) (0.262) (0.576) (0.261)
Non-Profit x Acc 0.265 0.819∗∗ 0.183 0.162 0.272
(0.209) (0.404) (0.215) (0.440) (0.211)
District x Acc 0.222 −0.253 0.293 0.204 0.228
(0.289) (0.423) (0.309) (0.492) (0.294)
Local x Acc 0.332 0.827 0.243 1.370 0.183
(0.438) (0.689) (0.436) (0.909) (0.433)
Peak Acceleration −0.108 −0.478 −0.051 −0.318 −0.076
(0.224) (0.395) (0.232) (0.447) (0.228)
Hospital controls yes yes yes yes yes
HSA controls yes yes yes yes yes
county FE yes yes yes yes yes
service FE yes yes yes yes yes
service-specific output yes yes yes yes yes
n 198k 27k 172k 23k 177k
Dependent variable is the natural log of the percent of costs that are outside contracts, and includes only
those observations with positive outsourcing. HSA controls include population, percent black, percent poor,
median household earnings, and four educational mix variables. (d) indicates a dummy variable. Standard
errors, clustered by hospital, in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10. Dependent variable
excludes all physician services costs, regardless of contracting type.
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services. Throughout, we can find no significant results for district hospitals (although the
full-sample results are marginal), perhaps because they make up a relatively small fraction of
the hospitals. Again, we present these results graphically in Figure 5 (for physician-intensity)
and Figure 6 (for labor-intensity).
The final point to note is that the seismic cost shocks do not seem to be strongly cor-
related with the outsourcing intensity of the for-profit firms, as the uninteracted effect of
peak acceleration is never significant (although in the case of labor- and physician-intensive
services, it is quite large). This is consistent with a simple model of the (null) effect of
fixed-cost on profit maximization.
5 Alternative Explanations
Although we believe that the different trade-off between net revenues and production bias
induced by the non-distribution constraint is the best explanation of the outsourcing pattern
that we observe, we recognize that alternative explanations exist. In this section we consider
several leading candidates.
Nonprofits may simply have a bigger in-house production possibility frontier. Maybe
the employees of nonprofits are more intrinsically motivated and donate labor, because they
agree with the mission, which lowers the cost of performing services in-house. Maybe the
tax advantages lowers the real cost of in-house production. But if this story is driving the
observed patterns, why do nonprofits’ outsourcing decisions conform more with for-profits
when times are tough? If it is simply a difference in production constraints, and not a
difference in the marginal willingness-to-substitute between cost and production bias, we
should see for-profit and nonprofit firms respond similarly to fixed-cost shocks, but they do
not.
Alternatively, outsourcing could involve a non-monetary management effort. The firm
uses costly time and expertise to go out and cultivate a good relationship with a service
provider. Since money is less valuable than time or effort to nonprofits, relative to the
for-profit (on the margin), nonprofits are less likely to want to make this investment in
provider relationships. This story could be captured in our model, where the production bias
here is simply managerial effort slack. This alternative explanation could emerge from the
exemption of teaching hospitals from the prohibition of directly employing physician labor. If
teaching hospitals are more likely to be nonprofit, this may lead to less contracting experience
disproportionately for nonprofits. This interpretation of management effort is inconsistent
with the data, however, at least for private non-profits, because this inexperience/managerial
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(a) Non-Profit
(b) District
(c) Local
Figure 4: Intensive Margin Ownership Effects as Function of Cost Shocks
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(a) Non-Profit, Intense (b) Non-Profit, Not Intense
(c) District, Intense (d) District, Not Intense
(e) Local, Intense (f) Local, Not Intense
Figure 5: Ownership Effects as Function of Cost Shocks and Physician Intensity
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(a) Non-Profit, Intense (b) Non-Profit, Not Intense
(c) District, Intense (d) District, Not Intense
(e) Local, Intense (f) Local, Not Intense
Figure 6: Ownership Effects as Function of Cost Shocks and Labor Intensity
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slack would have to manifest itself only in selective portions of the hospital’s contracting of
services outside of physician employment. In the data, nonprofits seem just as willing as the
for-profits to put in the managerial effort to outsource non-physician-intensive services, like
grounds and maintenance or accounting service.
One other difference between nonprofits and for-profits that we have not explored is the
firm’s ability to access credit markets. Since nonprofits are not able to issue equity, they
have a restricted set of instruments available to generate cash. If nonprofits have a hard time
getting trade credit from suppliers, they may prefer the constant, certain cost of employment
over the fluctuating costs of contracting. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with the
attractiveness of outsourcing increasing as the budget gets tighter and free cash, presumably,
declines. If doing services in-house minimizes cash demands, nonprofits should bring even
more services in-house when a cost shock makes cash even more valuable. We observe the
opposite.
A related concern is that nonprofits garner a significant fraction of their capital from
endowments, financed by donors. Maybe donors like to buy capital goods, rather than fund
contracts to outside providers. Once the capital is in place, the benefit of outsourcing the
labor, alone, is small. However, this explanation is inconsistent with the pattern we see in the
outsourcing of labor-intensive services. For public hospitals, we know that labor-intensive
services are relatively less intensively outsourced, but for private nonprofits there seems to be
no difference in relative outsourcing between labor-intensive and non-labor intensive services.
These patterns suggest that the labor/capital mix has little to do with outsourcing decisions
(in the private nonprofit case) or goes the “wrong way” (in the public case).
Finally, there could be a sample selection story. Maybe some services are profitable
for a small hospital to offer only if outsourcing opportunities exist. Nonprofits offer these
services whether the services are profitable or not, while for-profits only offer them if they
are profitable (Horwitz 2007). If this were the case, we would see these particular services
being differentially done in-house by nonprofits, even though if all hospitals offered them,
outsourcing rates would be similar. To check this, we limit our investigation to a subsample
of services that are offered by nearly all hospitals, yet the size/significance of the relationships
we identify are quite similar. If the outsourcing patterns were mostly a selection story, we
should see these differences get much smaller in the non-selected sample.
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6 Conclusion
We find that private nonprofit, public, and for-profit hospitals consistently and significantly
differ in the extent to which they outsource services. Controlling for a variety of poten-
tial confounders, nonprofit and district hospitals outsource less than for-profits, and local
hospitals outsource least of all. The difference between nonprofits and for-profits seems to
be driven by services for which control of the manner of production is particularly impor-
tant. The sort of services for which control is important seems to differ between public
and private nonprofits, however. Finally, all types of nonprofit hospitals come to look more
like for-profits if they are hit with a large fixed-cost shock, such as an expensive seismic
retrofitting requirement. For the private nonprofits, all of these results are consistent with
a model in which a non-distribution constraint leads nonprofits to trade off between costs
and control at a different rate than for-profits do. The private nonprofit differential seems
to be driven primarily by physician-intensive services, suggesting the elite workers may be
influencing managers to keep control of the services that are important to them, but that
does not seem to be the complete story for local public hospitals. Instead, it looks like pub-
lic hospitals also prefer to conduct labor-intensive services in house, suggesting the public
managers (are induced to) value control over labor per-se. All these differences are tested
on services excluding physician costs, so differences in behavior are from choices outside of
physician contracting legislation.
These findings shed new light on two literatures: the determinants of the make-or-buy
decision in organizations other than traditional profit-maximizing firms and the differential
behavior of nonprofit versus for-profit versus public firms.
We provide the first empirical demonstration that there is an economically significant
divergence between the way for-profit firms draw their firm boundaries and the way that
similarly-situated nonprofit and public firms do. This difference occurs both in terms of
levels and in terms of how the boundaries move in response to cost shocks. Furthermore, it is
not simply a difference between nonprofit and for-profit firms, because the difference between
public nonprofits and private nonprofits is just as big as the difference between private for-
profits and private nonprofits. In brief, if we think about outsourcing as a tradeoff between
cost and control over the manner of production, nonprofits seem to value cost relatively less
and control relatively more, at least as long as the nonprofit is not too close to its shut-down
constraint. One way of putting the public hospitals into this story is that they value control
over production much more than they value costs, especially for tasks that are labor-heavy.
The extent to which models of outsourcing behavior derived in the for-profit context can
be directly applied to the decisions of public and nonprofit organizations depends on the
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economic circumstances in which these organizations find themselves. When firms’ budgets
are relatively tight, nonprofit firms seem to make outsourcing decisions in much the same
way as for-profit firms do. But when nonprofit firms are far from their shut-down constraint
they seem to deviate more strongly from for-profits.
Second, we provide new evidence about other dimensions of production differences across
ownership types. Nonprofits not only provide a broader range of services (Horwitz 2007),
they perform a larger fraction of those services themselves. Finally, consistent with much of
the literature (Chang and Jacobson 2011, Duggan 2002), we find that the three ownership
classes react very differently to economic shocks. In particular, nonprofits and for-profits
react quite similarly along the extensive margin (much like they do along the shut-down
margin (Chang and Jacobson 2011)), but react very differently along the intensive margin.
This is more evidence that nonprofits act very much like budget-limited consumers, and not
like unconstrained profit maximizers.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
Lemma 1: bfp ≤ bnp The bfp satisfies I ′(bfp) = −ρ, while bnp satisfies v′(I(bnp))I ′(bnp) =
−ρ. Since v′ < 1, by assumption, the nonprofit’s condition requires I ′() < −ρ, and by the
concavity of I that requires b > bfp.
Proposition and Corollary 1 Using the Ij(b) notation, we know by revealed preference
that Inp(b
np) ≤ Ifp(bnp) and Ifp(bfp) ≤ Inp(bfp). It follows immediately from the continuity
of the indifference curves that there exists a b ∈ [bfp, bnp] such that Ifp(b) = Inp(b). Since the
nonprofit firm has strictly convex indifference sets, the curves can cross only once, yielding
uniqueness. Once existence and uniqueness are established, the enumerated conditions are
immediate. Finally, the condition for outsourcing follows from the definition of I. The
corollary follows from the fact that Ij(b) ≥ I(b), so if the outsourcing production frontier is
outside the own-production frontier only when b < b∗, then for the range of interest Inp > Ifp
and for-profits will outsourcing whenever nonprofits do. The other case is similar.
Proposition 2 For some set of parameters, take some b < b∗. From Proposition 1, Inp(b)−
Ifp(b) > 0. Inp(b) is defined implicitly by
v(Inp(b)− F ) + ρb = v(Inp − F ) + ρbnp.
The implicit function theorem allows us to calculate the derivative of Inp(b) with respect to
F :
(3)
∂Inp(b)
∂F
=
v′(Inp(b)− F )− v′(Inp − F )
v′(Inp(b))
< 0,
where the sign of the numerator comes from the fact that v′ is decreasing and Inp(b) > Inp,
since b < b∗ < bnp. Note, we use the envelope theorem here to ignore the effect F through
bnp. We can perform a similar exercise to calculate the derivative with respect to ρ:
(4)
∂Inp(b)
∂ρ
=
bnp − b
v′(Inp(b))
> bnp − b,
where the final inequality holds since v′ ≤ 1.
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Finally
(5)
∂2Inp(b)
∂ρ∂F
=
(∂bnp/∂F )
v′(Inp(b))
− b
np − b
[v′(Inp(b))]2
v′′(Inp(b))(
∂Inp(b)
∂F
) < 0,
since both terms are negative. The first, since (∂bnp/∂F ) < 0 and the second since both
v′′(· < 0) and (∂Inp(b)
∂F
) < 0 (from equation ??, above), but bnp > b.
Ifp(b) is given by
Ifp(b)− F + ρb = Ifp − F + ρbfp,
and can by solved for explicitly as Ifp(b) = Ifp + ρ(b
fp − b). The derivative with respect
to F is zero, while the derivative with respect to ρ is bfp − b, and the cross-partial is zero.
Comparing these derivatives to those derived above for the nonprofit gives the results of the
proposition. For F , and the cross-partial, it is immediate. For ρ, it follows from the fact
that bnp ≥ bfp.
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